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Thinking of Biology

The Evolutionary
Indeterminism Thesis
TIMOTHY SHANAHAN

Evolutionary indeterminists argue that, in addition to any indeterminism introduced by quantum events, at least some evolutionary processes are
themselves fundamentally indeterministic. That is, they maintain that the chance element in evolutionary processes results from indeterminism in
the processes themselves, rather than simply from our cognitive limitations. Not everyone has been persuaded. A number of philosophers have argued that claims for evolutionary indeterminism are premature at best and deeply confused at worst. They maintain that evolutionary processes
can and should be understood as deterministic processes. According to them, “chance” is merely a word denoting our ignorance of causes. This controversy is now one of the liveliest topics in the philosophy of biology. This article reviews the main arguments on each side, showing how the issues
at stake in this debate raise fundamental questions about the nature of science as an explanatory enterprise and of the world it seeks to explain.
Keywords: evolution, determinism, indeterminism, fitness, drift

I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to
the swift, nor the battle to the strong...but time and chance
happeneth to them all.
—Ecclesiastes 9:11

Chance is a word devoid of sense; nothing can exist
without a cause.
—Voltaire

I

n the early decades of the 20th century, physics underwent a dramatic revolution in which the classical, deterministic worldview associated with Newtonianism gave way
to a conception of the world transformed by discoveries in
quantum mechanics. According to this conception, probabilities do not simply reflect our limitations as cognitive
agents; they reflect the fundamental physical structure of the
world. Despite insistence by some scientists that quantum phenomena must be deterministic after all (memorably expressed in Einstein’s assertion that “God does not play dice”),
physics shows no signs of returning to a deterministic conception of the world.
According to some thinkers, evolution is also fundamentally indeterministic. They argue that, in addition to any indeterminism introduced by quantum events, at least some
evolutionary processes are themselves fundamentally indeterministic. If true, this would represent a revolution in our
understanding of evolution on a par with the revolution that
shook physics a century ago.
Claims of imminent scientific revolution are a dime a
dozen. Bona fide scientific revolutions, however, are hard to
come by. Is there reason to conclude that we are on the brink
of such a momentous event? Not everyone has been

persuaded. A number of philosophers have argued that claims
for evolutionary indeterminism are premature at best and
deeply confused at worst. They maintain that evolutionary
processes can and should be understood as deterministic
processes. Evolutionary indeterminists, of course, disagree. The
controversy continues unabated and is now one of the liveliest topics in the philosophy of biology.
The moment is opportune for an overview of this debate,
both for its intrinsic interest and because a number of farreaching issues are at stake. Although at one level the debate
between evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists is a local disagreement about the nature of evolutionary processes, at a deeper level it concerns both the purpose of scientific theories and the fundamental relationship
between biology and the physical sciences. Arguments for evolutionary indeterminism typically presuppose that, both
methodologically and conceptually, biology enjoys considerable autonomy from the physical sciences. Arguments for
evolutionary determinism, on the other hand, take consilience within and among the findings of various branches
of science as a fundamental value for an integrated scientific
conception of the universe. The issues raised in the debate over
evolutionary indeterminism thus go to the heart of our understanding both of science as an explanatory enterprise and
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of the world it seeks to explain. To clarify these issues, the arguments for and against evolutionary indeterminism must be
examined with some care. First, however, it is essential to understand the terms of the debate and to be as clear as possible
about what the debate over evolutionary indeterminism is, and
is not, about.

Evolutionary indeterminism
Although it will require some unpacking, the claim advanced
by evolutionary indeterminists can be stated quite simply.
The evolutionary indeterminism thesis: The probabilistic
concepts that appear in evolutionary theory represent genuine indeterminacies in evolutionary processes themselves,
rather than being required simply because of our cognitive
limitations. Evolutionary processes contain indeterministic
elements in addition to any indeterminism resulting from
events at the subatomic level.

Evolutionary determinists reject this claim and defend its
contrary.
The evolutionary determinism thesis: The probabilistic
concepts that appear in evolutionary theory are required
because of our cognitive limitations, but they do not represent genuine indeterminacies in the evolutionary processes
themselves. Evolutionary processes contain no indeterministic elements other than those resulting from indeterminism among events at the subatomic level.

Both theses concern the relationship between evolutionary theory and evolutionary processes. Evolutionary processes are
those biological processes that bring about intergenerational
changes in the genotypic or phenotypic composition of a biological population (i.e., Darwin’s “descent with modification”). According to the neo-Darwinian account of evolution,
such changes are brought about by the interaction of various
evolutionary causes, among them selection, drift, mutation,
and inbreeding. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, is the
collection of models, principles, generalizations, and subtheories proposed to explain evolutionary change. Examples
would be Wright’s shifting balance theory, Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection, Eldredge and Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibria, and the thermoregulatory theory of the origin of feathers. Evolutionary theory is the
collection of abstract human constructions intended to account for the concrete facts of the evolutionary process as they
are accessible to us through observation and experiment.
Further distinctions are necessary to clarify the terms of the
debate. Theories are either probabilistic or classical (nonprobabilistic). Probabilistic theories make use of probabilistic concepts. For example, statistical thermodynamics is a
probabilistic theory because (among other things) it makes
use of the probabilistic concept of entropy in describing how
energy is likely to be distributed in a closed system. Classical
theories make no use of probabilistic concepts. Newtonian
physics, for example, treats the motion of any object as fully
describable in terms of the various forces acting upon it;
probabilities play no role whatsoever. Whether or not a
164 BioScience • February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2

theory is probabilistic depends entirely on whether it employs
probabilistic concepts.
Processes, on the other hand, are deterministic or indeterministic. A process is deterministic if the events that make
up the process are the necessary consequences of antecedent,
sufficient causes. To take the classic example, one billiard
ball hitting another billiard ball would be a deterministic
process if the collision of the first ball with the second was sufficient (in those conditions) to cause the second ball to move.
A process is indeterministic if the events that make up the
process are not the necessary consequences of antecedent, sufficient causes. According to a widely held interpretation of
quantum mechanics, some subatomic processes are not the
necessary result of events that preceded them. For example,
whereas physicists can assign a probability to the emission of
a particular particle from a substance undergoing radioactive
decay, they cannot, even in principle, identify a set of sufficient causes for the emission of that particle. Their inability
to do so is not a result of cognitive limitations. Instead, it reflects a fundamental fact about the nature of physical reality.
The distinctions between classical and probabilistic theories, on the one hand, and between deterministic and indeterministic processes, on the other, are orthogonal to one
another. Newtonian dynamics is thus a classical theory of deterministic processes. Statistical thermodynamics is a probabilistic theory of deterministic processes. Quantum mechanics is (in part) a probabilistic theory of indeterministic
processes. Classical theories of indeterministic processes are,
perhaps not surprisingly, conspicuous by their absence.
These distinctions are essential for understanding the debate over evolutionary indeterminism. All participants in
the debate agree that evolutionary theory as it currently exists, and is likely to exist in the future, makes use of probabilistic
concepts such as fitness and drift, and hence that evolutionary theory is a probabilistic theory. But they part company in
their explanations of the sources of the probabilities that figure in evolutionary theory. According to evolutionary indeterminists, probabilistic concepts figure in evolutionary theory because they represent objectively indeterministic
processes in nature and are thus necessarily ineliminable
from evolutionary theory. In this respect, evolutionary indeterminists see evolutionary theory as akin to quantum mechanics. According to evolutionary determinists, on the other
hand, evolutionary processes per se are fully deterministic, and
evolutionary theory employs probabilistic concepts only because we cannot know every microevent transpiring in the
course of evolution. They hold that this simply reflects our limitations as cognitive agents; in principle (although not in
practice), probabilistic concepts are eliminable from evolutionary theory. Thus, evolutionary determinists see evolutionary theory as a scientific theory akin to statistical thermodynamics.

Quantum indeterminism and evolutionary processes
Perhaps surprisingly, evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists agree that there is an element of
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indeterminism in the fundamental structure of physical reality as described by quantum mechanics and that indeterminism at this fundamental level can have effects in biological systems. This point of agreement is encapsulated in the
percolation argument.
The percolation argument: Indeterminism in the most
fundamental physical processes, as described by quantum
mechanics, can “percolate up” into (i.e., have effects in)
macrolevel physical systems. Biological systems are
macrolevel physical systems. Therefore, indeterminism in
the most fundamental physical processes can have effects
in biological systems.

As Bruce Glymour (2001) notes, “There is reason to believe
that it is not only possible for [biological] mechanisms to
translate quantum indeterminacy into stochastic behavior at
macro levels, but also that such mechanisms exist” (p. 527).
Others have gone further to explore in detail how this might
happen (Stamos 2001). Yet none of this has the slightest
bearing on the issue of evolutionary indeterminism, which
maintains that there are sources of indeterminism in evolution over and above any indeterminism resulting from quantum mechanical factors. The question is whether there are distinctive forms of evolutionary indeterminism in addition to
the indeterminism contributed by events at the subatomic
level. Evolutionary indeterminists claim that there are; evolutionary determinists deny this. But more clarification is
needed.
Reducible versus irreducible indeterminism. To get at this critical issue, we can deploy a further distinction between two different kinds of indeterminism. Indeterminism at the subatomic level is what might be called “irreducible”
indeterminism, meaning that the indeterminism in question is fundamental at that level and cannot be explained in
terms of indeterminism at some lower level of events. On the
other hand, any indeterminism that occurs at the macro level
as a result of indeterminacies at the quantum level is reducible indeterminism; it is indeterminism that is not fundamental to the macrolevel but rather has percolated up to
that level from some lower level where it is fundamental. Indeterminism at the macro level that results from indeterminism at the quantum level is derivative, not fundamental,
because its explanation is to be found in events at a lower level
of organization. Reducible indeterminism has its ultimate explanation in indeterminism at some lower level. Irreducible
indeterminism, by contrast, cannot be explained further in
terms of indeterminism at some lower level. But how does this
distinction help to clarify the debate over evolutionary indeterminism?
Reducible versus irreducible evolutionary indeterminism.
Evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists
agree that evolutionary processes contain reducibly indeterministic elements, thanks to quantum-level indeterminism.
But because the indeterminism in question has its origin in
the subatomic realm, there is nothing distinctively evolu-

tionary about it. The debate between evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists turns on whether there
is irreducible evolutionary indeterminism: that is, sources
of indeterminism in evolutionary processes that arise from
the nature of those very processes and cannot be attributed
to indeterminism percolating up from the quantum level. Evolutionary indeterminists argue that irreducible evolutionary
indeterminism is real, whereas evolutionary determinists
deny this. This, then, is the point on which the entire debate
turns. What sorts of arguments can each side marshal in defense of its claims?

Arguments for irreducible
evolutionary indeterminism
Evolutionary indeterminists offer four arguments in support of irreducible evolutionary indeterminism. Each is
examined below, along with responses by evolutionary
determinists.
The fitness argument. According to standard presentations
of evolutionary theory, natural selection is a sampling process
operating on heritable variation in fitness among individuals at some level of the biological hierarchy. That is, natural
selection is the process that sorts biological entities on the basis of differences in their fitness. Those biological entities
with greater fitness will tend to enjoy greater biological success (survival, reproduction, or both) than those entities with
less fitness. There is, of course, no guarantee that greater fitness will always translate directly into greater biological success. Although fitter organisms will, on average, tend to be
more biologically successful, events can always interfere with
this outcome. Hence,“fitness” can be interpreted as a propensity to survive and produce viable offspring (Mills and Beatty
1979). According to a widely accepted view, selection operates directly on such propensities.
Evolutionary indeterminists accept the interpretation of fitness as a propensity, noting that at best there is a probabilistic relationship between fitness and actual biological success. If so, then fitness as a propensity for biological success
constitutes a genuinely probabilistic property of biological entities and hence warrants the claim for irreducible evolutionary indeterminism.
Evolutionary determinists reject this argument. The problem lies not with the propensity interpretation of fitness per
se, which they can readily accept, but rather with the unexamined assumption that selection operates directly on fitness
differences—an assumption that, on closer analysis, turns
out to be false. Selection operates on phenotypic differences,
but these phenotypic differences need not represent fitness differences (Shanahan 1990).
To make clear the causal structure of selection events, evolutionary determinists may simply describe selection events
as follows:
Phenotypic traits → deterministically cause → biological success
(in a specified environment)
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Notice that the concept of “fitness” nowhere appears in this
causal chain. Fitness as a propensity for biological success is
not a property that causally interacts with the environment.
To see this, consider the following two hypothetical organisms
and their properties. (Numbers represent arbitrary values of
fitness components—that is, specific properties—which together determine overall fitness.)
Organism A
Disease resistance
8
Visual acuity
7
Protective coloration
5
Fleetness
4
Social status
2
Overall fitness (total) 26

Organism B
3
5
4
6
8
26

Although these two organisms differ in their phenotypic
properties, they have identical overall fitness. According to the
propensity interpretation of fitness, therefore, they have equal
probabilities of biological success when situated in the environment in relation to which their fitness values are determined. However, despite their identical overall fitness, in any
specific interaction with the environment only a small subset of their phenotypic properties, rather than fitness per se,
determines how biologically successful the organism actually
is. For example, if a disease epidemic broke out, killing organism B (with low resistance) but sparing organism A (with
high resistance), this would be an example of natural selection, despite the absence of overall fitness differences between the two organisms.
It might be tempting to respond that although overall fitness differences play no causal role in differential biological
success, various components of overall fitness nonetheless do.
In the example above, the two organisms differed in their components of fitness. In an environment that includes a disease
epidemic, perhaps it was the fitness difference in one of the
components (i.e., disease resistance) that resulted in their
differential biological success. But even here, what directly determines an organism’s fate is not its propensity for surviving disease but rather the specific way in which its properties
in fact interact with those of the environment, resulting in its
survival (Shanahan 1989, 1992).
To see this, consider an analogy. For any (fair) coin, we may
say that when flipped it has a propensity for coming up heads
50 percent of the time. Suppose that we flip the coin and it
comes up heads. If we now ask why it came up heads on this
particular toss, it is clear that appealing to its propensity for
coming up heads roughly half of the time provides an explanation of sorts, but there is a deeper explanation available
in which propensities play no part whatsoever. The factors that
caused this particular coin to come up heads on this particular toss were its initial position on the back of the flipper’s
thumb, the amount of force applied, the number of turns in
the air, the elasticity of the surface it landed on, and the like.
Knowing that it is a fair coin and thus has a certain propensity may help us to predict how a series of tosses is likely to
166 BioScience • February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2

turn out. But if we flip the coin a number of times, and it
comes up heads a certain number of times, it is still not the
case that its propensity for coming up heads was the cause of
this outcome. This outcome came about because of the particular factors operative in each toss of the coin. The total number of times the coin comes up heads is simply a product of
these individual factors. The coin’s propensity per se plays no
causal role whatsoever.
To bring the discussion back to biology, fitness as a propensity for biological success is not a property of an organism that
causally interacts with the environment, and thus it plays no
causal role in the process of evolution itself. As Elliott Sober
(1984) notes, fitness is “causally inert.” If so, then an appeal
to the propensity interpretation of fitness cannot warrant a
claim for evolutionary indeterminism.
Why, then, does the concept of fitness play such an important role in evolutionary theory? For the evolutionary
determinist, the answer is straightforward: The concept of fitness allows us to make useful generalizations and predictions. Dark-colored moths in a predominantly dark (e.g.,
soot-covered) environment are more likely than their lighter
conspecifics to enjoy greater biological success in that environment. Hence we are justified in claiming that the darkcolored moths have greater fitness, and we might accordingly
expect the relative proportion of dark- to light-colored moths
to increase in the course of several generations. One can say
that a given organism was more biologically successful than
another because of the former’s superior fitness, but this is just
a shorthand description that leaves open the question of why
this organism fared better than its conspecifics. As Sterelny and
Kitcher (1988) note, “In principle, we could relate the biography of each organism in the population, explaining in full
detail how it developed, reproduced, and survived, just as we
could track the motion of each molecule of a sample of gas.
But evolutionary theory, like statistical mechanics, has no
use for such a fine grain of description: the aim is to make clear
the central tendencies in the history of evolving populations”
(p. 345).
There is no doubt that probabilistic concepts like fitness play
an essential role in evolutionary explanations (Ariew 1998).
But the considerable utility of the concept of fitness in evolutionary theory provides no reason to conclude that the
process of natural selection involves any irreducibly indeterministic element (Graves et al. 1999, Rosenberg 1988, 2001).
The drift argument. A second argument for evolutionary
indeterminism focuses on the concept of drift. According to
the standard account, “drift” describes a process in which
evolutionary change is the result of sampling error. It can occur in several ways (Beatty 1984). First, among sexual organisms a kind of lottery takes place in which some genes do,
and some do not, find their way into gametes and hence
have the possibility of being transmitted to the next generation. If there is no strong selection for or against the genes in
question, gene frequencies can drift in a direction unrelated
to selection pressures. Despite the lack of selective advantage
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of a trait in a population, that trait might still increase in the
population from one generation to the next just because
more of the individuals possessing that trait happened by
chance to survive and reproduce than did those lacking the
trait. Because such changes are random with respect to fitness
differences among individuals, they cannot be predicted from
a knowledge of fitness differences. At best, we can assign
probabilities to estimates of the relative frequencies of such
traits in future generations. According to evolutionary indeterminists, such probabilities in evolutionary theory represent
irreducible indeterminism in the processes themselves.
Critics of evolutionary determinism have insisted that
drift is both real and an indispensable concept in evolutionary theory (Brandon and Carson 1996, Millstein 1996, 2002).
In response, evolutionary determinists point out that establishing the reality (or evolutionary significance) of drift is one
thing, but showing that drift entails a distinctive form of
evolutionary indeterminism is another matter entirely. They
maintain that the fundamental principle of evolutionary determinism is operative here no less than in cases of natural selection: Whether the events in question concern genes or
phenotypic characteristics, in all contexts outside of the peculiar domain of quantum mechanics we are justified in assuming that identical causes result in identical effects. Given
the same genetic and developmental events, in the same environment, the same evolutionary effects will follow. If the evolutionary indeterminist responds that this is more a restatement of determinism than an independent argument for it,
the evolutionary determinist can reply that the burden of proof
lies with the evolutionary indeterminist to show why this
general principle, accepted by evolutionary indeterminists in
all contexts outside of quantum mechanics, fails to apply
with equal force to evolutionary processes.
Rather than make a direct appeal to principles, the evolutionary determinist can also ask us to consider the nature of
drift as a causal process by considering a relatively simple example. Suppose that a forest fire sweeps through an area,
killing 90 percent of a breeding population, and that survival
is unrelated to fitness differences. Presumably one could not,
before the fire struck, predict to a high degree of accuracy precisely which organisms would survive and which ones would
perish based on a knowledge of the particular traits of each
organism. Yet in retrospect the differential survivorship is
fully explainable in terms of a set of sufficient causes that resulted in precisely that outcome. Some organisms survived because they were located near the periphery rather than near
the center of the fire and so were able to escape. Those able
to escape did so because their sensory organs interacted with
factors in the environment such that they identified the location of the fire, engaged their locomotory apparatus, and
fled directly away from it. Others perished because their
brains misinterpreted the data from their sensory organs
and ran toward, rather than away from, the fire. The behavior of each of these organisms could be specified further in
terms of individual neurobiological and physiological
processes. In each case the organism possessed some set of

physical properties that, in causal interaction with the environment, resulted in differential biological success. At no
point is there any need to appeal to irreducibly indeterministic processes. As Barbara Horan (1994) notes, “As far as we
know, the macroscopic environment faced by individual organisms is replete with deterministic processes, so all possible worlds that agree with this one in all respects relevant to
the origin, course, and extent of a natural disaster...that creates a founder population, will also agree on the subsequent
sample of breeding individuals....The same fire...in the same
conditions would create the same sample” (p. 84). “Drift” in
this view is simply a term referring to those evolutionary
processes resulting in differential biological success, the causes
of which we are ignorant (Rosenberg 1994); the indeterminacy is entirely in our understanding of the processes rather
than in the processes themselves.
An experimental confirmation of evolutionary indeterminism? A third argument for evolutionary indeterminism proposes to dispense with thought experiments by treating the
issue as an empirical problem that can be settled by experimental investigation. Brandon and Carson (1996) note that
“if [evolutionary] determinism is true...then identical organisms in identical environments should have identical evolutionary fates” (p. 329). They offer an experimental test of
the evolutionary determinist thesis: Many organisms are
clonable, and clones may be placed in the same carefully
controlled environment, with the results recorded. When
this is done, the results are unequivocal. Despite the genetic
identity and identity of environmental conditions for the
plants grown by Bever (1994), there were significant differences among the phenotypes of the resulting plants. Brandon
and Carson take this as an empirical refutation of evolutionary determinism and therefore as a vindication of evolutionary indeterminism.
Predictably, evolutionary determinists find this argument
unconvincing. First, this example concerns development
rather than evolution. An argument for irreducible biological indeterminism with regard to development will not sustain the claim of irreducible evolutionary indeterminism.
Second, even if the connection between developmental indeterminism and evolutionary indeterminism could be made,
in the experiments cited there is no way to control for indeterminism resulting from quantum-level effects, which are not
at issue in the debate over irreducible evolutionary indeterminism. Third, even if quantum-level effects could be ruled
out, it is impossible to eliminate all differences between the
plants and their respective environments, and thus it is always
possible that undetected differences (“hidden variables”) are
responsible for the phenotypic variance observed (Weber
2001). As chaos theory makes clear, there are limits to the precision of any measurement of initial conditions, and these limits cannot, even in principle, be transcended. Initial conditions
can therefore vary even if we are unable to detect such differences. Over time these small initial differences can be compounded into huge, macroscopically significant effects. Chaos
February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2 • BioScience 167
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theory gives determinism a new lease on life. Living things are
the most complex entities known. It is among living things,
most of all, that one would expect to see the effects of chaos
in action. An experimental refutation of evolutionary determinism therefore seems doomed to failure.
The scientific realism argument. Evolutionary indeterminists maintain that a commitment to scientific realism requires accepting the idea that the probabilistic concepts appearing in evolutionary theory refer to irreducibly
indeterministic processes. Brandon and Carson (1996) point
out that in science the positing of theoretical entities is taken
seriously only when (a) positing such entities aids the development of theory and (b) the available empirical evidence supports the assumption that such entities exist. But whereas “the
positing of genuinely probabilistic propensities governing
the evolutionary fates of individual organisms has been an integral part of the impressive development of evolutionary population genetic theories in this century.... the positing of deterministic hidden variables in evolutionary theory serves
no theoretical purpose at all” (Brandon and Carson 1996, p.
331). In addition, whereas all the evidence supports the idea
of probabilistic propensities, the notion of deterministic hidden variables in evolution is contradicted by the empirical data.
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, therefore, evolutionary indeterminism should be accepted.
This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, the
relationship between scientific realism and evolutionary indeterminism is far more complex than this argument suggests
(Weber 2001). Second, as Brandon and Carson admit, the experimental evidence they cite is perfectly consistent with a deterministic interpretation of evolution. It is therefore difficult
to see how the notion of deterministic hidden variables in evolutionary theory is “contradicted by the empirical data.”
Third, it is far from clear that the positing of probabilistic
propensities has been as potent, and the positing of hidden
variables as impotent, in the history of evolutionary biology
as this argument asserts. What are considered hidden variables
at one stage of science (e.g., genes) may become manifest variables at some later stage. Finally, and most critically, this argument conflates evolutionary theory with the process of
evolution. Even if a given perspective is theoretically useful,
it does not follow that the entities postulated are real (consider the ontological status of epicycles in Ptolemaic cosmology). As Alexander Rosenberg (1994) notes, “The question of whether evolutionary phenomena are stochastic [i.e.,
indeterministic] is different from the question of whether our
best theory of these phenomena is unavoidably statistical [i.e.,
probabilistic]. Our best theory, present or future, may turn out
to be statistical because the deterministic facts about evolution are beyond our cognitive and computational powers to
apprehend in useful terms” (p. 59). Because both deterministic and indeterministic phenomena can be described probabilistically, the fact that a theory is probabilistic is no guarantee that the processes it describes are indeterministic.
Hence, arguments that appeal to a realist conception of sci168 BioScience • February 2003 / Vol. 53 No. 2

ence lend no support to the claim of evolutionary indeterminism.

The case for evolutionary determinism
Showing that arguments for a given view fail is insufficient to
establish the contrary view, because there may be insufficient reasons in support of either view. What positive arguments can evolutionary determinists offer in support of their
view? Besides pointing out that the various arguments for evolutionary indeterminism fail, evolutionary determinists maintain that only their view conforms with the understanding of
the world required by the physical sciences. This conviction
is encapsulated in the “unity of the sciences” argument.
The unity of the sciences argument: According to our best
physical theories, all macrolevel physical processes are
(apart from any indeterministic effects percolating up from
the quantum level) entirely deterministic. Evolutionary
processes such as selection, drift, and migration are all
macro-level physical processes. Therefore, evolutionary
processes are (apart from any indeterministic effects percolating up from the quantum level) entirely deterministic.

The unity of the sciences argument is predicated on what could
be called “ontological/process reductionism”: the principle that
biological systems are composed entirely of entities of the sort
studied by chemistry and physics, and that biological processes
consist entirely of chemical and physical microprocesses.
Any indeterminism associated with biological properties
would have to be explicable in terms of properties at a subbiological level. But our best understanding of the physical
structure of the world provides no reason to suppose that there
are sources of indeterminism in physical systems in addition
to those associated with quantum phenomena. Were the
claims of evolutionary indeterminism true, a fundamental revision in our understanding of the physical world would be
required on a par with that which accompanied quantum mechanics a century ago. Evolutionary determinists remain unconvinced that adequate motivation exists for any such drastic revision of worldview. In the absence of such motivation,
evolutionary determinism should be embraced.
Despite its apparent simplicity, this argument for evolutionary determinism faces problems of its own. On the one
hand, it emphasizes that our understanding of evolution
should accord with our understanding of the purely physical domain. If the purely physical domain is deterministic, then
so too is the biological domain. Yet our understanding of the
physical domain does not come to us in unfiltered form directly from nature itself. It is mediated by our best scientific
theories: that is, the theories that have proved most theoretically fruitful and empirically adequate. Those theories tell us
that (apart from any quantum-level effects) the physical
world is fully deterministic. But if so, then the evolutionary
indeterminist can point out that ultimately the evolutionary
determinist is putting faith in the referential success of our best
scientific theories in a given domain to tell us what the phenomena in that domain are really like. This is, of course, precisely what the evolutionary indeterminist proposes to do with
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regard to our best theories of evolutionary phenomena. The
dilemma: The evolutionary determinist cannot invest faith in
the referential accuracy of our best physical theories while rejecting appeals to the referential accuracy of our best biological theories—unless, that is, scientific knowledge in one domain (physics) is to be privileged over that in another
(biology). Doing so, however, is likely to encounter intense resistance among those who have labored long and hard to argue that, whereas biology is indeed distinct from physics in
fundamental respects, it is no less scientific and no less revealing of the nature of the world (Mayr 1982, 1988).

a rapprochement between the physical and biological sciences would eventually be forthcoming. Darwin’s confidence
in the explanatory power of his theory, as it turned out, was
fully justified. Neither philosophical arguments nor appeals
to Darwin’s historical example are at present sufficient to resolve the debate over evolutionary indeterminism. Yet the
issues at stake in this debate raise fundamental questions
concerning our understanding of both science and the nature
of the world it attempts to explain, and thus are worthy of continued critical reflection.

Acknowledgments
The evolutionary indeterminism
debate and the nature of biology
As David Stamos (2001) speculates, although the debate between evolutionary indeterminists and evolutionary determinists appears to be about the nature of evolutionary
processes, at a deeper level the disagreement concerns the more
fundamental issue of the relationship between biology and the
physical sciences. Evolutionary indeterminists argue that the
success of evolutionary theory warrants the claim that the
probabilities it uses are objective features of the processes it
describes, even if this requires positing indeterminacies that
have no explanation in chemistry or physics. Evolutionary indeterminists do not consider this problematic, because evolutionary theory (and biology more generally) already deploys
concepts that transcend explication in purely physical terms
(e.g., competition, camouflage, mimicry, and sexual selection).
Methodologically and conceptually, biology enjoys considerable autonomy from the physical sciences.
Evolutionary determinists, on the other hand, argue that,
although biology can and must make use of concepts that have
no direct analogue in the physical sciences, nonetheless the
processes described by these concepts must all, at the end of
the day, be explicable in purely physical terms. Evolutionary
determinists uphold consilience within and among the findings of various branches of science as a fundamental requirement for a unified scientific conception of the universe.
In support of this value, they can appeal to the example of Darwin, who took the idea of consilience very seriously, as he was
convinced (and attempted to convince others) that the broad
range of facts drawn from widely different sciences (e.g.,
geology, embryology, and biogeography) made sense only
in light of his theory. In addition, evolutionary determinists
can point out that Darwin was genuinely worried that estimates of the age of Earth provided by the physical sciences of
his day provided insufficient time for the slow march of evolution to have reached its present state, a worry that would
make sense only if he believed that ultimately the physical and
biological sciences revealed a single interconnected but immensely complex world.
Alas, evolutionary indeterminists can appeal to Darwin as
well, noting that he did not retract his theory in light of the
apparently conflicting data coming from the physical sciences, but instead maintained confidence that, so great was
the explanatory power of the concepts deployed in his theory,

I would like to thank Barbara Orton and three anonymous
reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
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